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W. W. Rostow was one of key foreign policy makers as well as one of the outstanding 
economic historians in the 1950s and 1960s. Not only did he create the ‘take-off’ theory, he 
played great roles as an advisor for President Kennedy and Johnson on national security. In his 
books published in the 1950s, nationalism, the necessity of social reform and new leadership 
were themes paid attention to in the Third World countries in order to carry out economic 
development.  
Among all of his works and activities in the 1950s and 1960s, it is not difficult to find that 
his ‘take-off’ theory was only a part of his perspective. Nevertheless, he was very famous as an 
economic development theorist not only to common people, but to scholars in South Korea in 
the 1960s. This is a case of the Koreanized process. Like other western theories, South Korean 
scholars accepted the part of western theories that were relevant to them in the light of South 
Korean situation.  
 
 
1. ECONOMIST OR FOREIGN POLICY DESIGNER? 
 
Walt W. Rostow is famous (or notorious) for his outstanding work, The Stages of 
Economic Growth; A Non-Communist Manifesto (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1960). His name has gained currency among Koreans since the 1960s as an economist, the 
field where he created the “take-off theory” which is the third among his five stages. He was 
a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) from 1951 to 1960, and the 
University of Texas in Austin from 1968 to date.  
The Stages of Economic Growth, published in 1960, argued that economic growth was a 
multi-staged process, stimulated by a widespread desire for the improvement of life as well 
as the search for profits. 1  According to Rostow, this “modernization” process was 
characterized by a crucial “take-off” period of rapid growth stimulated by the expansion of a 
few key economic sectors. Rostow, as the subtitle of his book, counter-posed his model to 
that of Marx and used it as the ideological underpinning for his policy approach towards the 
developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America (Parker 1980: 143).2 His influence 
was enormous in many countries, especially those that experienced colonization and were 
then liberated after World War II. 
He is also regarded as a designer of U.S. foreign policy under the Kennedy 
Administration. His career as policymaker commenced in the middle of the 1950s as an 
adviser to Sen. John F. Kennedy (D. Mass.) on foreign policy. After inauguration, Kennedy 
appointed him deputy special assistant to the president for foreign security affairs. He was 
moved to the State Department as chairman of the Policy Planning Council in November 
1961, like another George Kennan. In 1964, he was appointed to the additional post of U.S. 
                                                        
1 The five stages he created is the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, 
the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption.  
2 His theory was influenced by Simon Kuznets and Albert Hirschman (Oman and Wignaraja 1991: 
11-12). 
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representative to the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. From 1966 he 
was back in White House as a special assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. 
Throughout his life, he vigorously worked for the government in spite of the fact that he 
spent more time as a professor than as a policymaker. He played a large role in both the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, as his career displays. Nevertheless, there are few 
works on his theory, focusing especially on his ideas on foreign policy. John Lodewijks tries 
to analyze his theory from the viewpoint of security and military strategy, while not focusing 
on his ideas on the Third World (Lodewijks 1991). 
 
 
2. ROSTOW’S NEW APPROACH TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
   2.1. Changing the Third World 
 
Rostow’s criticism of U.S foreign policy toward Asian countries had three components. 
First of all, he believed the U.S had no interests in Asia in the 1950s. He thought that while 
there was a decreasing possibility of European war with the Soviet Union, "the place where 
the Communists intend to expand is Asia" (Rostow 1955: 6-7; Rostow 1960: 337). In his 
book, he expressed the belief that the core of the Cold War was a struggle against not only 
the Communist bloc, but also against nationalism in underdeveloped countries in Asia.  
The population in these undeveloped countries was an overwhelming proportion of the 
world. If they got stronger, the U.S would face significant danger. Colonial experiences, 
racial problems, and problems of color might bring hostility. The U.S should reconcile and 
establish close relations with these countries in order to avoid their hostility towards the U.S 
(Rostow 1957: 141-142). 
He thought that the matters related to Asia were directly related to U.S security, and that 
the ideological menace in Asia was stronger than that in Europe. Nevertheless, while aid to 
Europe had consisted of both military and economic aid, i.e. NATO and the Marshall Plan, 
aid to Asia had only been military.3 
Secondly, he believed that American foreign aid policy had a strong military bias in the 
1950s. “[I]n emergency efforts either to salvage situations which have been permitted to 
degenerate, such as South Korea and Indo-China, or to put out additional brushfires if they 
get started,” America had devoted itself to military aid against the Communist bloc, rather 
than supporting the development of stable and effective societies (Rostow 1957: 2, 5, 11). 
As a result of the existing military bias, world opinion of the U.S administration was 
damaged, he thought. He stressed, “[i]f we are to maintain an alliance embracing the Asian 
peoples, it is essential that they understand and believe in our peaceful purpose. The 
widespread belief in Asia that we intend to launch aggressive war is already extremely costly 
to us. And should war come, its outcome in both political and power terms may well hinge 
                                                        
3 Shortly before the Korean War, President Truman planned to carry out the Point IV Program in 
1949. This Program was considered an attempt to improve economic condition in underdeveloped 
countries. The ECA assistance plan to South Korea in 1949 and 1950 was based on the Point IV 
Program. Oral History Interview with Ambassador John J. Muccio, Washington D.C. Feb.10 and Feb 
18, 1971. By Jerry N. Hess, Harry S. Truman Library Independent, Missouri, Jan. 1972, p.21. Rostow 
also recognized that Point IV was the starting point for foreign assistance from the perspective of 
economic development in Third World countries (Rostow 1960). But the program was not carried out 
because of the outbreak of the Korean War.  
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on whether or not Asians believe that it was started by us.” In the end, the U.S ought to 
reduce military aid and increase another means (Rostow 1955: 14). 
Lastly, America should concentrate on stimulating economic growth in underdeveloped 
countries. Basically, he felt that military aid for countries that had inappropriate economic 
stages would bring disaster to the U.S as well as to the undeveloped countries. U.S. military 
assistance should be changed to economic development aid, and even if some of the 
undeveloped countries, like India and Egypt, were hostile toward the free world, aid to those 
countries should be provided in order to change their attitude. In the end, the success of U.S 
economic aid might ensure psychological success in the Third World (Rostow 1955: 13-14; 
Rostow 1957: 12-13; Rostow 1960a: 464). 
In conclusion, he strongly stressed the necessity of a great transition, that the balance of 
aid towards the Third World should shift from military grants to economic loans. This would 
clearly bring about a valuable psychological effect in the Third World. If the Third World 
succeeded in economic growth through U.S economic aid, people in the Third World might 
logically find the capitalist method of economic growth superior to that of the socialist (or 
communist) method, and containment of the Communist bloc would be successful.4  
 
[W]e must strive … [t]o eliminate the ideological threat of Communist victory in Asia by 
encouraging and reinforcing the steady progress of Asian nations toward independence as free 
democratic societies. For the idea of Communism cannot be destroyed. It can only be replaced. 
And it can be replaced by democratic principles only if these principles prove themselves in 
action. 
… The most promising line for Communist advance is in Asia. Thus a major defeat of 
Communism in Asia might have decisive over-all consequences.  
The United States interest in Asia means, in the end, that we face complex and difficult 
tasks. We must be prepared to meet the challenge of raw military power when it is used against 
us, as in Korea. … Simultaneously, we must bend our creative efforts by every possible means 
and over a long time toward building economic and political strength in the societies of Free 
Asia (Rostow 1955: 6-7). 
 
Asians must make up their own minds. If their view of Communist theory and practice is 
false, it will not be altered by exhortation or rhetoric from us. It may be altered by a flow of 
reliable and relevant information combined with their own experience (Rostow 1955: 13). 
 
In addition, he believed that an emphasis on economic aid would seem neutral and would 
change people's minds about U.S intentions in the Third World. Throughout the 1950s most 
Asian people thought that the U.S was responsible for wars and military crises; for example 
the Korean War. He strongly emphasized that the U.S should show people in the Third World 
that U.S economic aid would clearly be granted unrelated to military aid, and that the 
undeveloped countries could thus be convinced of the greater potential for economic growth 
under capitalism.  
 
 
                                                        
4 Rostow’s theory has a lot in common with George F. Kennan's containment theory. In fact, in the 
preface of his book (Rostow 1960a) he acknowledged Kennan's assistance. Nevertheless, there is an 
important point of difference between the two theorists; Rostow seriously considered the importance of 
non-vital areas, whereas in Kennan's theory the main focus was on five military industrialization 
centers, the United States, Germany and central Europe, Japan, Britain, and the U.S.S.R. In that sense, 
his theory also has similarity with Paul Nitze’s which was expressed well in a document, the NSC 68 in 
1950 (Rostow 1964; Gaddis 1982: Chapter 2 and 3). 
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The United States should sharply reduce its exhortation and pressure for anti-Communist 
action in Southeast Asia. We should not link economic assistance to military aid (Rostow 1955: 
13). 
 
   2.2. Nationalism as a Power for Economic Development 
 
In order to let the undeveloped countries in Asia carry out economic development plans 
and succeed in economic growth, he argued that the characteristics of those societies should 
be understood, and the U.S should consider these characteristics carefully in order to decide 
the extent and kind of economic assistance. In his theory there were common social and 
psychological features in those countries derived from their colonial experiences.5 
First of all, the influence of socialism and communism arose in those countries after their 
liberation from colonialism, particularly among intellectuals and political leaders (Rostow 
1960b: 228-235). Social discontent was expressed by the ‘words of Marx’ or the ‘theory of 
Lenin,’ and this tendency was closely connected with nationalism. 6  
In particular, he paid attention to the significance of nationalism in the Asian region 
rather than communism, and believed that there was a possibility that nationalism could play 
an important role in triggering economic development. In general development theory, one of 
the most important elements which undeveloped countries have to fulfill is to gain the active 
support of their people, i.e. national integration (Tinbergen 1958: 5-8). Rostow himself 
considered the people’s consensus on the necessity of economic development as the first and 
foremost condition (Rostow and Milikan 1957: 44-45; Rostow 1960b: 23-25).  
As he wrote in his book, nationalism would be indispensable at the stage of the "pre-
condition for take-off" (Rostow 1960b: 25-26). Nationalism could stimulate ‘motivity’ as 
well as the capitalist interest motive, and this power should be activated in the course of an 
economic development plan (Rostow 1960b: 55-56). The use of nationalism might be, on the 
one hand, a response to the ‘Communist conspiracy’ which intended to manipulate 
nationalist leaders in the Third World (Rostow 1964: 126-127). On the other hand, people 
who commonly had strong nationalist sentiments in Asia should concentrate not on hostility 
toward developed countries, but on modernization or industrialization (Rostow 1960a: 439). 
Secondly, there was another psychological factor: most people in those countries 
considered economic growth to be more important than political democratization. Having 
experienced political chaos shortly after liberation, they concluded that the most important 
problem was not political, but economic. This experience left them feeling the necessity for 
economic development. Therefore, nationalism could join with people’s passion for 
economic growth, he anticipated.  
                                                        
5 It is not difficult to catch the similarity between colonialism and economic development theory. 
The origin of economic development theory was colonialism (Hunt 1989: 44-45). Almost all of 
economic development theories emphasize the positive effect of colonialism, and defined that effect as 
one of the basic conditions for economic growth after liberation. Since imperialists before 1945 
publicly aimed at modernization in the colony, the Third World received the benefits throughout the 
colonial period (Rostow 1960b: 57-58). Moreover, he asserted that foreign invasion and conquest was a 
basic element that generated nationalism, an inevitable factor in national modernization (Rostow 1971: 
62,72,95). 
6 The nationalist trend powerfully spread through those countries. According to Rostow, this was 
derived not only from the colonial experience, but also from the inferiority associated with internalized 
racism (Rostow 1955: 4-5,10). Like China, North Korea, and Vietnam, Asian communism has strong 
nationalist tendencies. 
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Since people in the Third World prioritized economic growth over political development, 
it might be possible for them to accept authoritarian governments that would efficiently push 
economic development plans.7 This was rationalized in two points. One was to diversify the 
concept of democracy (Rostow 1955: 14-15). Rostow defined the concept of democracy as 
"the elements of democracy include the matter of desire and the direction of the movement" 
(Rostow 1964: 14-15). This meant that the acceptance of the desire and the direction for 
economic growth might not be inconsistent with the American-style democracy.   
The other was to consider economic development an inevitable prerequisite for political 
improvement in underdeveloped countries. As economic development theorists in the 1950s 
argued that economic growth might automatically solve the problem of just distribution, he 
asserted that economic development was a necessary or sufficient element for political 
democracy. In short, the success of an economic take-off could set the stage for stable 
democracy (Rostow 1964: 123). 
Considering the commonality in the Third World countries, as I mentioned, why did he 
stress social conditions, especially nationalism? This is because Rostow stressed the role of 
recipient countries. As he reexamined U.S. foreign aid in the 1950s, he exhumed the 
ineffectiveness of U.S. economic assistance. The reason stemmed not only from the 
administrative structure of U.S. foreign aid, but also from the lack of capacity of absorption 
capital in the recipient countries. From this viewpoint, he paid attention to the preparedness 
in recipient countries. Therefore he stressed the necessity of alternative groups for a new era, 
as I will mention later, that were able to carry out social reforms to strengthen the capacity of 
absorption capital in recipient countries. In the end, throughout the process of the new era, 
nationalism might become a crucial and effective means to mobilize the entire nation’s assets.  
 
2.3. To Be Done 
 
He suggested new methods to support his ‘New Look’ on foreign policy: one was a new  
approach of the U.S. aid, the other was U.S support for new classes or groups in the Third 
World.  
First, he emphasized the necessity of U.S. public investment. Because of political, social, 
and economic instability, it would not be easy to attract private capital, he believed (Rostow 
1957: 16-19).8 Moreover, he proposed the necessity of long-term (at least five years), 
planned economic development loans, instead of grants, that were implemented in the 1950s 
under the Eisenhower administration (Rostow 1957: 126-128). Since the annual amounts and 
projects for these grants had been decided by the U.S. Congress each year throughout the 
1950s, many difficulties occurred in carrying out "the projected aid" in the recipient 
countries, including Korea.  
In addition, the role of Western social scientists, including Rostow himself, was 
emphasized, as one of the technical aid within economic assistance.  
 
 
                                                        
7 Rostow's approach, on the other hand, is closely related to the emphasis on the role of the state. 
According to his take-off theory, the state had to intervene not only in tax and budget matters, but in 
social matters such as education, public health, etc.. This intervention would be indispensable, 
especially at the take-off stage (Rostow 1960b: 62-63). 
8 In fact, the Eisenhower Administration tried to induce private capital to invest in the Third World. 
This was very well shown in the case of Korea (Park 1999: 97). 
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A sober evaluation of the modern world’s experience of the transition to sustained growth, 
focused on the concrete problems and setting of Asia would give confidence and perspective to 
those now charged with guiding the development plans of Free Asia. This is not so much a task 
for governments as one for Asian and Western social scientists to undertake together (Rostow 
1955: 13). 
 
The second point was closely related to the post war situation in the Third World. He 
believed that in order to execute economic development plans the emergence of new leader 
groups, consisting of ambitious young people from poor rural areas, would be needed 
(Rostow 1957: 26). The group would never have a connection with pre-modern productive 
relationships, for the sake of modern structural reforms. According to his theory, such groups 
would consist of intellectuals, merchants, and military personnel (Rostow 1960b: 23-25). He 
didn't believe that either industrialization or modernization could be achieved without 
meeting this condition. 
In this assumption, he strongly emphasized the role of military organization and 
personnel. He mentioned that the military organization in underdeveloped countries was the 
only aisle of social mobility for modernization. In particular, he paid attention to the fact that 
there were few ladders for rural people to raise their social strata. In addition, the military 
system provided opportunities for many youths who performed military duty, in compliance 
with the conscription system, to be exposed to modern technology and administration 
(Rostow 1957: 26-9). He added that military personnel were the major actors throughout the 
economic development courses, and political stability and the necessity for security might be 
maintained if they participated in politics. 
In research that supported Rostow's assertions on the military role written by Milikan, 
Rostow's colleague at the Center for International Studies, M.I.T., he said it might be 
necessary to educate officers of the Third World in the U.S. as one aspect of military aid. 
Those courses should include not only technology and military strategy, but also discussions 
about military mobilization for economic, political, and social development in the Third 
World. Moreover, he emphasized the formation of new groups consisting of economists, 
specialists, agricultural technocrats, jurists and bureaucrats, medical doctors, and professors, 
which were lead by ‘confident’ officers (Milikan and Blackmer 1961: 45-46, 49-51).9 
With this approach, what kind of economic structure should be recommended?10 It was 
not to be an independent economy, but one which had a place within the international 
capitalist economy. On the one hand this was related to the speeded up economic 
development, because the Third World should continue to accept a great amount of foreign 
capital and various kinds of developed skills and technology. On the other hand this goal 
might be chained to future business in the developed countries from an economic perspective. 
If many countries in the Third World succeeded in economic growth and maintained strong 
positions in the Free World, the developed countries would enjoy a favorable international 
                                                        
9 The South Korea’s May coup of 1961 occurred during the process of designing a new U.S. policy 
towards South Korea by the Presidential Task Force on Korea, organized in April 1961. Coincidentally, 
young military officers in South Korea carried out the coup just when Rostow’s theory was expanding 
its influence among the bureaucrats in the U.S. In fact, Rostow recalled that the success of the May 
coup in 1961 was attributed to his recommendation to President Kennedy. At the crucial moment when 
President Kennedy tried to decide how to deal with the coup, according to his interview, he strongly 
recommended that the president support the young military officers in South Korea (Kim 1992). 
10 From Rostow's viewpoint, in general, 75 years might be needed for underdeveloped countries to 
become developed countries (Rostow 1960a: 413). 
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climate for their own continued economic growth (Rostow 1957: 55-56).  
Rostow also proposed the establishment of unbalanced economic structures in order to 
include developing economies in the ‘ swamp’, i.e. the capitalist trade system. On  the basis of 
the unbalanced growth theory of Albert O. Hirschman, he stressed the development of 
leading industries, and also proposed that the U.S. actively use its surplus products in foreign 
aid (Rostow 1960b: 93-100). In the end, he clearly stated that;  
 
The economic development program outlined in the balance of this book is conceived as 
one of the instruments for carrying out the task of helping create an environment within which 
American society can thrive. … 
As our emergence into national maturity lifts our horizons beyond our own shores, and as 
we come to agree as a people how to manage democratically our mature capitalist economy, we 
need the challenge of world development to keep us from the stagnation of smug prosperity 
(Rostow 1957: 6-8).  
 
He also stressed that the U.S. should reduce its international economic and military 
burden. Accordingly, he proposed not grants and military aid, but development loans and 
economic aid. And he also stressed the role of the recipient countries: "[o]ur projects were 
designed in order to support those who help themselves" (Rostow 1964: 25). This meant that 
it was indispensable for recipient countries to try harder to design, to mobilize, and to carry 
out economic development plans in order to guarantee successful economic growth.  
 
 
3. WHERE IS THE TAKE-OFF THEORY? 
 
Rostow’s proposal stressing long-term economic development aid in public form, social 
reforms of underdeveloped countries, and the necessity of new groups, gradually gained 
currency within the Eisenhower administration, as I examined in chapter 2.  
His opinion got popularity among the administration in the late 1950s, and triggered 
changes of U.S. foreign policy toward the Third World countries. The most decisive turning 
point was his participation in Kennedy's camp for the 1960 presidential election.11 Rostow’s 
viewpoint was represented well in a paper produced by the Presidential Task Force on 
Foreign Economic Policy, where Rostow and Millikan belonged.  
 
The new aid program must recognize these motivations and provide the resource incentive 
for local leaders to direct nationalistic forces into constructive channels of building democratic 
nations. It should give support especially to the leaders who are eager to modernize society...  
Failure of Present Program to Respond to the Problems of the Underdeveloped Nations. : 
The present program tends to look to private investment to carry the burden of development 
assistance. This fails to recognize the strength of nationalism in most underdeveloped areas and 
the unwillingness of private investment to move rapidly into areas needing such assistance... Its 
operations are hindered also by numerous legislative and policy directives. Authorized and 
funded primarily on an annual basis, it lacks continuity.12  
 
This paper shows that the new policy called for a new kind of typical leadership in the 
                                                        
11 Recorded interview by Richard Neustadt,11 and 25 April,1964,JFKL Oral History Program, pp. 
20, 113, 149. 
12 Task Force Report, Dec. 31, 1960, National Security File(NSF): Subjects: Foreign Economic 
Policy, Box 297, John F. Kennedy Library(JFKL). 
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Third world, substitution of private investment by public loans, and emphasis on nationalism 
in the Third World. 
So what was the position of the take-off theory in his whole perspective? Or what was the 
role of the take-off theory in his foreign policies? There is a crucial memorandum that gives 
us insights about the role of the take-off theory.13 
 
In general, the new look consists of a turn-around from a defensive effort to shore-up weak 
economies and to buy short-run political and military advantage, to a coordinated Free World 
effort with enough resources to move forward those nations prepared to mobilize their own 
resources for development purposes. Aid ends when self-sustained growth is achieved and 
borrowing can proceed in normal commercial ways...  
What we can do is shift rapidly out of defense support and special assistance into long-term 
development lending in places where there appears to be a basis for turn-around (e. g., Taiwan, 
Korea, Turkey, Greece, the Philippines, and even, perhaps Iran). ... on notice that they must 
develop serious domestic programs before any increases in aid will be granted; e. g., Indonesia 
and Afghanistan. ... Most important of all, we must promptly expand our commitments to those 
countries which now have the capacity to absorb capital productively in a reasonably short 
period; e. g., India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela. 
 
Through this memorandum, it is not difficult to find the position of his “take-off” theory: 
his “take-off” theory is a part of his overall ideas on foreign policy. In the document, we can 
find that in order to use U.S. economic development assistance effectively, he classified the 
recipient countries into two stages. According to the stages the U.S. should differentiate its 
assistance, he argued.  
In his book, A proposal also shows that his take-off theory is a part of his ideas on foreign 
policy. The take-off theory was dealt with in chapter one of his 14 chapters.  
 
 
4. TAKE-OFF: BELIEF OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE 
 
In South Korea, his theory was introduced in the late 1950s by famous economists in 
newspapers and journals (Choe 1959; Choe, Mun Hwan, 1961; Lee 1961; Lim 1963).  
Chiefly intellectuals and economists in South Korea were very interested in his take-off 
theory because of the atmosphere in the 1950s and the 1960s. In particular, his theory played 
a great role in getting intellectuals to give up their desire for balanced growth, and to change 
the Korean people’s obscure desires into obvious confidence.  
There were a number of disputes on economic development planning in South Korea in 
the 1950s.14 These disputes were derived from people’s consensus on economic growth in 
the 1950s (Park 2000a: 16-38). Chiefly the ‘balanced growth theory’ created by Nurkse 
gained popularity throughout the 1950s, like in other underdeveloped countries.15 Without a 
                                                        
13 Memorandum to the President, February 28, 1961, from Rostow, "Crucial Issues in foreign Aid," 
NSF: Meetings & Memoranda: Staff Memoranda, Walt W. Rostow, Foreign Aid, 2/24/61-2/28/61, Box 
324, JFKL. 
14 The Economic Development Committee was established in 1958 under the Department of 
Rehabilitation. The committee was responsible for designing an economic development plan. 
According to records of meetings of the committee, they chiefly deliberated the balanced theory and 
considered carefully the Japanese economic recovery process after 1945.  
15 Lewis’ and Tinbergen’s books were also introduced and translated in South Korea. The Import 
Substitute Industrialization strategy created in Latin America was introduced in 1959 in a journal 
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clear economic strategy, the balanced growth theory was accepted broadly among 
intellectuals in South Korea. Even into the early 1970s, many economists regarded the theory 
as almost a mythical guide to economic growth (Lee 1990; Yu 1983). The myth continued to 
exist in economic development plans until the middle of the 1960s.  
The first impact against the balanced theory was triggered by Charles Wolf, Jr., who was 
a member of the RAND Corporation and was dispatched under a contract with the ICA to 
serve as a special economic adviser for Prime Minister Chang Myeon in April, 1961. 
Although he stayed in Seoul for about a month, he examined and criticized an economic 
development plan designed by the Chang Administration in 1961. One of the main points he 
mentioned was that Korean policy makers and economists had to accept new theories like the 
unbalanced theory by Hirschman instead of accepting just the balanced theory (Wolf 1961). 
Many economic bureaucrats wanted to continue to work under his advice, and then the 
military junta established in May 1961 asked the American government to dispatch him 
again as an economic adviser for the chairman of the Supreme Council for National 
Reconstruction.  
Nevertheless, the unbalanced theory could not gain currency among Koreans until the 
middle of 1960s. The military junta tried to adopt the unbalanced theory partially in its own 
economic development plan in 1962, but too many criticism were raised against the attempt, 
according to a memoir of a key member in the junta, Yu, Won-sik. Because of this tendency 
in Korea, the balanced theory continued to have a strong influence until the middle of the 
1960s when the second five-year development plan was designed.  
The most important impact was Rostow’s visit to Korea on May 3, 1965.16 First of all he 
had a long conversation with President Pak Chong-Heui. The next day he visited Seoul 
National University and delivered a presentation, entitled “Economic Development in Asia,” 
in front of students and professors. There were very interesting disputes on economic 
development planning in South Korea as well as on his theory. At that time, shortly after the 
Korean-Japanese Normalization in 1965, strongly nationalist sentiments were popularized 
among Korean students who had actively taken part in demonstrations opposing the 
normalization in 1964 and 1965. 
In his presentation at Seoul National University, Korea’s economy was classified as at the 
take-off stage, along with India’s, Pakistan’s, the Philippine’s, Malaya’s, and Taiwan’s. He 
also emphasized the role of agriculture, which could solve the basic need problem while also 
providing raw materials for industrialization, and the necessity of foreign aid to speed up 
economic development. He scarcely mentioned his viewpoints on U.S. foreign policy.  
Although there were numerous criticisms of Rostow’s theory, the word “take-off” became 
an important discourse in the South Korean society.17 From President to commoner, “take-
                                                                                                                                               
published by the Korea Bank. After the 1960s, progressive economists criticized economic 
development theories formed in the West based on the Dependency Theory along with Marxist theory.  
16 Several economists and bureaucrats had the experience of meeting him before 1966. Shortly 
before the May coup in 1961, three bureaucrats belonging to the Finance Department visited 
Washington, D.C. in order to explain the plan designed by the Chang Administration and to get funds 
for the sake of implementing the plan. At that time they met him at a hotel, and after the meeting for 
about an hour, he called them “take-off” boys. In 1963, Kim Jong-pil, who was a director of the KCIA, 
met him and discussed economic development in South Korea. Rostow remembered the episodes when 
I interviewed him in 1998 at his office in Austin, Texas.   
17 During the 1950s, Pak, Heui Beom who was a professor at Seoul National University and later 
became a special adviser for Park, Cheong Heui, vigorously criticized Rostow’s theory. In his opinion, 
Rostow’s theory was not appropriate for South Korea’s economy. His theory was called an “inward-
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off”, in Korean Toyak (‘ ØÂ ∏) became a symbol of Korea’s economic growth. There were few 
university entrance exams that did not contain a question on take-off theory throughout the 
late 1960s and the 1970s.  
Through his theory, in the end, not only intellectuals saw that the possibilities of the 
‘unbalanced growth theory’ over of the balanced, were realistic, but also that the Korean 
people started to have confidence in achieving rapid economic growth. People’s confidence 
might be one of the most important prerequisites for economic growth in the Third World, as 
Rostow mentioned in his book (Rostow and Milikan 1957: 44-45; Rostow 1960b: 23-25). 
On the other hand, however, the fact that almost all Koreans were uninterested in his 
whole theory on foreign policy deserves attention. In spite of the fact that Choe Ho-jin 
introduced Rostow’s ideas on foreign policy partially in a journal (Choe 1961), it is very 
difficult to find articles or books where his theory was carefully examined. Almost all of 
people in their 40s and 50s remember his name, even nowadays, but few people know that he 
was a designer of U.S. foreign policy in the 1960s.18 
The necessity of an economic development plan gained currency in the Korean society in 
the 1950s. Intellectuals in South Korea imported various kinds of economic development 
theories. However, as we can see from the case of the Rostovian theory, they saw the theories 
through a specific hole dug by drills that were made in accordance with their own concerns. 
Koreans accepted parts of Rostow's economic development theory while still ignoring many 
of his ideas. 
In a book titled Theory and Condition of Korea’s Economic Development I-a part of 
Theory and Policy I [Hanguk Gyeongjebaljeoneui Irongwa Hyeonsil I] published in 1969 by 
the South Korean cabinet, there are 17 articles written by outstanding economists of the time 
who took part in designing and advising economic development plans in the economic policy 
making process. Over a half of the authors commenced their articles with the introduction of 
the take-off theory and tried to analyze economic conditions in South Korea on the basis of 
the theory. Only one scholar, Byun Hyung-Woon raised questions on using Rostow’s theory 
as the principal method to examine Korea’s economic development during the 1960s. This 
book clearly shows us the position of Rostow’s theory in the discourse of South Korean 
society at the time.  
 
 
5. THE ‘KOREANIZED’ 
 
The spread of Rostow’s take-off theory in South Korea in the 1960s was one instance that 
clarifies the westernized modernization process in society as well as in academic circles. He 
played a critical role as one of the social scientists, as he noted, who could create and spread 
their own economic development theory in the Third World and make people feel confident 
in their ability to achieve economic growth in the Free World (Rostow 1955: 12-13). Of 
course, it should also be mentioned that a lot of intellectuals and bureaucrats who studied 
abroad, especially in USA, played crucial roles in the acceptance of the theory.  
From the economic viewpoint, requests by American policy makers under the new flow 
                                                                                                                                               
looking deepening strategy,” or “State-led Capitalism” (Kimiya 1991: 33-61; Park 2000: 39-46). 
18 When I found his book, A Proposal, in the Central Library, Seoul National University, just five 
professors’ names could be found in the last page of the book. During 40 years, a few professors at 
SNU paid attention to his role as a foreign policy designer.  
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of the Kennedy administration, were already partially accepted by the military junta and the 
Park Administration. The junta could not help but revise its own economic plan designed in 
1962. American officials asked that the economic plan as well as the economic policies of 
the junta be changed as a whole, and the revised plan was established in 1964. The key 
points of the requests focused on the reduction of the government’s role, construction of the 
labor-intensive light industry, use of foreign loans, a free trade system, and so on (Park 
2000b). 
The spread of Rostow’s take-off theory in South Korea is clearly a part of the 
modernization process. At the same time, however, it is possible to find an example of a 
Koreanized process through the attitude of Korean intellectuals. They accepted his theory 
partially through a specified hole made by their own necessity. They accepted the take-off 
theory alone among his foreign policy arguments. There were many cases in the 1950s where 
they imported economic theories from the West. The process of interpretation of Nurkse, 
Keynes, Lewis, and so on, also shows Koreanized process (Park 2000a: 70-76). 
Rostow visited Korea again in the early 1980s and gave a presentation to a meeting of the 
owners of the conglomerates and big companies. He recalled the bureaucrats who he had 
referred to as his “take-off boys”. I met Prof. Rostow in 1998. He was very pleased to meet a 
scholar from South Korea, a country he regarded as one of the successful examples of his 
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